Is There a Future in Run-off?
16 February 2000
Paul Jardine of Equitas Limited

Good afternoon Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to have been invited to speak today on the subject of run-off. I am reminded of the cautionary tale of the prima donna who during her after dinner speech was banging on about how her voice was insured, at Lloyd’s of course, for £1m. "Oh really", said a bored member of her unimpressed audience, "and what did you do with the money?".

Over the past 5 years there have been many changes in the world of reinsurance, not least the establishment of Equitas as a central part of Lloyd’s Reconstruction & Renewal. This afternoon I would like to spend some time looking at the current reinsurance market and the trends which fuel my belief that run-off, whether solvent or insolvent, will continue to be a significant feature over the coming years. I would then like to explore some of the key issues which need to be dealt with in order to produce successful run-off results, with specific reference to the lessons which we have learnt at Equitas over the past 3 years.

It is my belief that the trends we are seeing today will lead directly to a vast increase in the incidence of the run-off phenomenon and, I fear, in the frequency of insolvencies. Either way, the demand for high quality run-off management – whether in-house or outsourced – is set to grow, perhaps exponentially.

There are a number of key features of today’s reinsurance market which suggest that many carriers will simply not present a viable long-term business proposition for their capital providers. In terms of reinsurance purchased, there are a number of trends which indicate a potential significant reduction in the size of the cake:
  • Market consolidation and resulting stronger capital bases
  • Globalisation of the major players
  • Increasing mix between traditional and alternative risk transfer
  • A switch from P&C towards life and health
As a result of these changes we are seeing a marked switch away from proportional reinsurance towards non-proportional protections. Further it is clear that with increasing capital base and line sizes, retentions have increased and ceded volumes have reduced. Naturally, the shift towards excess of loss protections has also introduced potentially greater volatility into the reinsurers’ portfolios as the risk exposure per ceded premium has grown. Alongside this growth in volatility, we have seen an increase in the capital adequacy requirements which reinsurers need to demonstrate. It is often said that there is too much capital in the industry, but I believe that there is not enough capital. Risk based capital ratios appear to be too lenient - one underwriting season can break the bank – witness New Cap Re and GIO as recent examples. Looking to Western Europe, a market which has 18 separate territories, each different, and more than 5,000 non-life carriers will have to change.

Against the background of a changing demand for reinsurance both in terms of both volume and type, consolidation in the industry will continue. There are very strong business reasons for the consolidation – companies can leverage off the combined capital base and economies of scale. Troubled companies will be acquired as vehicles for expansion in a particular market and their assets stripped. Either way, portfolios of old run-off business will be created.

If we look at the reasons why companies go insolvent, we see some interesting trends and of more importance some clear parallels with the current market. A special report produced by A M Best in February of last year posed the question: "Insolvency: will historic trends return?". As you can see from the slide, the number of US insolvencies over the past 25 years has been vast, with the period between 1985 and the early 1990s displaying the greatest frequency. In this latter period the insolvency rate was broadly 2% by number of the companies operating in the market at that time.

The Best study identified a number of key reasons why companies fail with the primary causes being reserve deficiency and rapid growth. In many ways these two features go hand in hand – companies undercut their competitors to gain business and this leads to under-reserving. In addition to these features we have some other root causes of insolvency:
  • Catastrophes in the period from 1989-93 caused 20 insolvencies in the US
  • Asset failure including the impact of reinsurance failure
  • Marked shifts in business mix

If we look to today’s market and the key features, we see an environment of intense competition, extremely soft premiums, volatile bond and equity markets, and some notable troubled companies. Reinsurers’ results have been propped up by reserve releases over the past few years and on the horizon we have further potential natural and man-made catastrophes. Just witness the size of storm-related losses which have been reported over the past couple of months amidst rumours of whole local markets eroding their reinsurance programmes. All in all, it appears that we have almost perfect insolvency conditions.

So, the answer to the question of whether there is any future in run-off is a resounding "Yes".

A Sigma/Swiss Re study published in 1998 looked at what they termed the "run-off phenomenon". One of the headline numbers to emerge from the study was the value of the worldwide run-off market. Swiss Re estimated that US$230bn of liabilities resided within run-off portfolios and that the market was extremely concentrated – 85% of the US$230 billion was in five countries: US, UK, Japan, Germany and France. In addition, Swiss Re indicated that the run-off market was set to grow at 10% per annum with the growth rates in internal run-off portfolios at 15% owing to deregulation in continental Europe.

Given that run-off is here to stay and will be growing rapidly, what are the critical success factors?

Swiss Re identified three central objectives, which any run-off entity must deal with:

  • Cost reduction
  • Centralise credit control
  • Commute proactively
From my own experience at Equitas over the past three years, I would change the emphasis slightly and add a couple of other key objectives. First, it is vital for any run-off organisation to deal effectively with its broker relationships and establish the appropriate operating environment at the outset. The fact that a company in run-off may have no on-going business relationship with a broker leads to an inevitable lowering of the brokers’ performance. We have experienced a clear deterioration in the quality of service provided by brokers as regards the collection of outwards reinsurance recoveries. In many ways this is unsurprising since run-off does not represent a profit centre for the broker and ties up a significant cost and resource base. Hence, it must be in the brokers’ interest to resolve old books of business as quickly as possible although of course for the people actually involved it is a case of turkeys voting for Christmas. In order to control the movement of cash and the tracking of reinsurance billings, it is vital to attempt to deal direct with reinsurers and to attempt to cut out the broker completely. With the benefit of hindsight, part of R&R should have been the establishment of a dedicated broker within the Equitas structure.

The second area where a run-off company must focus attention is the way in which its relationships with its counterparties are managed. It is simply not enough to construct a principal ledger and hope that this in itself gets the cash moving. Whilst the ledger enables offset to be used within the relationship, it does nothing to clear old issues nor bring the overall relationship to a conclusion. If the stated aim of the company is to commute its outwards reinsurance asset, then it has to manage the entirety of the interaction with its counterparties, from soup to nuts as the Americans would say.

A more fundamental question linked to outwards reinsurance is whether the organisation wants to manage its own risk and investments, or whether it is prepared to delegate these tasks to a third party, i.e. its reinsurers. Notwithstanding the traditional arguments in favour of reinsurance such as capital borrowing, reciprocity and reinsurer expertise, many organisations fail to appreciate the hidden functional cost of reinsurance.

For Equitas, the vast scale and complexity of the reinsurance programmes means that the overall processing of reinsurance recoveries is a labour intensive and, hence, expensive exercise. Including internal and external costs, it is likely that 50%-60% of the Equitas cost base relates to reinsurance processing and collection – that is currently in excess of £100m per year. Contrast this with the Equitas investment department where we have five people looking after £6bn of investments. If we were to translate our reinsurance asset of £5bn into cash and invest it, the associated costs would be on the order of 0.1% or £5m, and what’s more, we would earn investment income. Our current reinsurance asset does not earn us anything in the way of a return. As an aside, when you consider that cost estimates in the aggregate for UK run-offs have been put at £750m per year and rising, the loss of investment return and excess cost is potentially massive.

Against this background, our strategy has to be to commute as much of the reinsurance asset as possible and to turn it into cash. This strategy will also serve to protect that portion of the asset which rests with reinsurers who are less than secure and will also involve the resolution of the various disputes which we inherited.

To give you some idea of the enormity of the task, I have prepared a number of statistics on our outwards reinsurance asset:

  • We have in excess of 250,000 separate reinsurance contracts placed with 3,000 reinsurers and 2,000 underwriting pools.
  • 4% of our reinsurance transactions account for 96% of the value of our reinsurance asset collected.
  • The top 10 reinsurers account for over 30% of the reinsurance asset, although no one reinsurer accounts for more than 4%.
  • The smallest 500 reinsurers owe less than £8m in aggregate, i.e. less than £50,000 per reinsurer.
In terms of cost reduction, Equitas is committed to reducing its cost base by 15% per year. We have achieved this so far and we are constantly looking at ways in which we can become more efficient. We have reduced the numbers of external contractors we use in both the reinsurance and claims areas, bringing much of the work in-house. In other areas we are exploring ways in which some of our operations can be outsourced. Given the significant cost base associated with reinsurance processing and collection, we have introduced a number of processes which seek to focus activity where it matters. We have placed a large number of syndicates into what we term "cold storage" – for these syndicates where the reinsurance asset is small, processing is carried out once per year, and across all syndicates we only process collection notes where the value exceeds $75,000. All of these initiatives are designed to minimise the cost of our operations.

Given what I have already said about the outwards reinsurance asset and the need to commute, one key issue remains unresolved within the London market – that old chestnut of the recoverability of IBNR on outwards reinsurance. We could create a lengthy conference on the matter but I will restrict myself to just a few remarks designed to demonstrate the significance of the issue to run-off companies.

In general, an inwards commutation will present issues regarding how reinsurers will respond to the deal. These issues will primarily surround the question of whether the IBNR element is recoverable or not but may also extend to other items such as interest, fees and ex gratia payments. What is clear that the market does not usually respond to IBNR as it arises within commutations; indeed in many cases it is debatable whether they actually are prepared to pay crystallised case outstandings. Given that commutations are the lifeblood of the run-off market, it is clear that this issue, to the extent that it prevents deals being done, will have a potentially disastrous effect on the ability of run-offs to manage their exit. Short of getting a marketwide agreement on the issue (and the ABI is working on this issue at present) or obtaining a legal judgement, there are a number of strategies which can help to avoid some of the problems:
  • Outwards first and then Inwards
  • Commute both together
  • Inwards first but with support of Outwards
  • Global deal but with no subsequent retro processing
  • Price deal net assuming no support for ceded IBNR
  • Be more specific regarding IBNR / allocate fairly transparently and factually
  • Loan or credit enhancement approach
Against these strategies it is important to bear in mind that in reality reinsurers do adopt a different position when it comes to an outwards commutation.
  • On pure outwards or within global deals reinsurers do pay outstandings and IBNR
  • Reinsurers do want to receive the benefit of underlying deals
  • Reinsurers do not generally support inwards deals (or that part of global deals) which include IBNR - perhaps the largest benefit
So, the run-off market is set to grow rapidly and will face a number of life-threatening issues. Just as with the on-going market, I believe that we shall see a move towards consolidation within the run-off industry. We have already witnessed the establishment in London of CMGL handling the old Zurich and Eagle Star portfolios amongst others and the acquisition of Bridgeway by Omni Whittington. This trend is set to continue as run-offs face the challenges of cutting costs and adding value. The original reasons put forward for the establishment of Equitas hold true for other run-off portfolios namely:
  • Economies of scale
  • Greater investment freedom
  • The ability to use large scale commercial offset
  • Dedicated specialised run-off management.
I wonder how long it is before we see a company market version of Equitas which can exploit these opportunities.

As I mentioned earlier, I believe that there are dangers in looking at run-off entities as on-going companies that simply lack an underwriting and marketing function. In order to be successful, management must view the issues as business challenges. Many run-offs fail to deliver their stated objectives because they simply replicate the conditions which caused them in the first place. All too often I am reminded of a summer vacation when to break the boredom of the inevitable lazy day by the pool, I shipped the family off to see the local archaeological site. Gazing with awe at the magnificent ancient temple, I asked the guide, "How old are the ruins?". "2007 years," came the prompt reply. "But how can you be sure of the precise year?" I challenged with typical actuarial aplomb. "Oh," said the guide, "the leader of the team who excavated the ruins told us that they were 2000 years old – and that was 7 years ago".

I hope that I have been able to give you some insight into the run-off phenomenon this afternoon and to the particular challenges which this business provides.

Thank you and I am happy to take any questions that you may have.
 
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